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NOS. 40223 & 40224 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY NOS. CR 2012-128 
& CR 2012-3216 
APPELLANT'S BRI 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Rafael Galvan requests that this Court grant review in this matter, which relates 
to the Idaho Court of Appeals Opinion in State v. Galvan, Docket Numbers 40223 & 
40224,2014 Published Opinion No. 18 (Feb. 28,2014) ("Opinion"). Review should be 
granted as the Opinion is inconsistent with this Court's recent holding in State v. Easley, 
MAY - 9 2014 
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14 Opinion No. 41 (Mar. 28, 2014).1 In the Opinion, the Court of Appeals held that 
use of Galvan's partial post-Miranda2 silence as evidence of 
his guilt did not constitute fundamental error under the standard set forth in State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). The Court of Appeals held that Mr. Galvan met the first 
prong the Perry standard because the use of Mr. Galvan's partial post-Miranda 
silence as evidence of his guilt potentially violated his Fourteenth Amendment due 
process rights. However, the Court of Appeals also held that Mr. Galvan did not meet 
the second prong of the Perry standard, because there is no controlling case law which 
specifically addresses the use of partial post-Miranda silence as evidence of guilt. This 
is inconsistent with Easley, where this Court held "for fundamental error to exist, it is 
[not] necessary for existing authorities to have unequivocally resolved the issue in the 
appellant's favor." Easley, 2014 Opinion No. 41, p.8. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
In docket number 40224, Mr. Galvan was charged, by Information, with stalking 
in the first degree. (R., pp.89-90.) After twenty three years of marriage, Lucina and 
Rafael Galvan began having marital issues and the couple separated. (05/14/11 
Tr., p.178, l,11 - p.180, l,6.) A few weeks after they separated, Mrs. Galvan obtained a 
civil protection order which prohibited Mr. Galvan from contacting her. (05/14/12 
Tr., p.180, LsA-21.) 
1 This Court published the Easley Opinion approximately one month after the Court of 
Appeals published the Opinion in this matter. As such, the Court of Appeals did not 
have the benefit of the Easley Opinion, when it issued the Opinion in this matter. 
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Mrs. Galvan testified that on various occasions Mr. Galvan following her in 
his car while she was driving home from (05/141'12 Tr., p.193, 
Mrs. Galvan testified that in August of 2011, he followed her to a store and spoke with 
her. (05/14/12 Tr., p.194, L.12 - p.195, L.7.) Mrs. Galvan then began driving home and 
Mr. Galvan followed her. (05/14/12 Tr., p.i 94, L.B - p.1 96, L.11.) 
Mrs. Galvan testified that during the first week of October 2011, she was driving 
home from work and noticed Mr. Galvan was in his car and passed her. (05/14/12 
Tr., p.204, Ls.7-i7.) Mrs. Galvan then testified that she passed him, and he then 
passed her again, and that this repeated for a period of time. (05/14/12 Tr., p.204, L.iB 
p.205, L.B.) 
Officer Broderick testified that, in October of 2011, he responded to a call 
involving two vehicles. (05/14/12 Tr., p.164, L.11 - p.165, L.1.) According to Officer 
Broderick, he was following Mr. Galvan who was following Mrs. Galvan. (05/14/12 
Tr., p.169, L.14 - p.170, L.3.) 
In docket number 40223, Mr. Galvan was charged, by Information, with 
aggravated assault and a deadly weapon enhancement. (R., pp.15-16.) At trial, 
Mrs. Galvan testified that on an afternoon in January of 2012 she arrived at work early 
because she had to pay some bills. (05/14/12 Tr., p.225, L.23 - p.226, L.17.) 
Mrs. Galvan was parked, sitting in her car, which was located in her employer's, 
Melaleuca, parking lot when she noticed Mr. Galvan's truck. (05/14/12 Tr., p.226, L.21 -
p.227, L.4.) Mr. Galvan asked her if they could resume their relationship and 
Mrs. Galvan told him no. (05/14/12 Tr., p.227, L.5 - p.228, L.7.) According to 
Mrs. Galvan, Mr. Galvan told her that he was going to kill her and himself and pulled out 
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gun. 4/12 Tr., p.228, l.8 ~ p.229, L.9.) Galvan that she eventually 
Mr. Galvan out of this decision. (05/14/12 Tr., 
Alicia Luna, Mrs. Galvan's co-worker, testified that she was parked in her car in 
the Melaleuca parking lot. (051'14/12 Tr., p.110, L.i5 - p.112, L.12.) She noticed that 
Galvan was speaking to a person in a car. (05/14/12 Tr., p.113, L.21 - p.115, L.3.) 
At first, Ms. Luna thought everything was normal and she put on some headphones and 
started listening to music. (05/14/12 Tr., p.115, LsA-6.) Ms. Luna said that she noticed 
Mr. Galvan pullout a gun, point it into the air, and then point it down. (05/14/12 Tr., 
p.115, Ls.6-10, p.1i6, Ls.19-25.) Ms. Luna also testified that she could not hear any 
words being spoken and she COUldn't see the person in the car. (05/14/12 Tr., p.11 
l.17 - p.117, L.i5.) 
Charity Schuldt, Mrs. Galvan's supervisor, testified that she had been informed 
by Ms. Luna that a "situation" was occurring in the Melaleuca parking lot. (05/14/12 
Tr.,p.141, Ls.7-17.) Ms. Schuldt called 911 and, while on the phone, walked in the 
direction of Mr. Galvan. (05/14/12 Tr., p.141, Ls.13-19, p.149, Ls.1-10.) Ms. Schuldt 
testified that she observed Mr. Galvan bring his hand up "as if to throw something" and 
then he got into his truck. (05/14/12 Tr., p.155, Ls.16-23.) Ms. Schuldt testified that she 
never saw a gun in Mr. Galvan's hand. (05/14/12 Tr., p.155, Ls.9-25.) 
Approximately four hours later, Mr. Galvan was arrested at his home. (05/15/12 
Tr., p.58, L.21 - p.60, L.9, p.63, L.14 - p.64, L.22.) Mr. Galvan was read Miranda 
warnings and began making admissions to the police. (05/15/12 Tr., p.62, Ls.1-6, p.63, 
Ls.12-22.) According to the arresting officer, however, Mr. Galvan would not respond 
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when asked if threatened Mrs. Galvan with a gun. 3 (05/15/12 Tr., p.62, Ls. 
During the closing argument, the prosecutor Mr. Galvan never 
denied having a gun when he was asked by the police, and that the jury could use 
Mr. Galvan's silence as to that question as evidence that he did, in fact, threaten 
Mrs. Galvan with a gun.4 (05/15/12 Tr., p.93, L.23 - p.94, L.6.) 
The jury ultimately convicted Mr. Galvan on both counts and the deadly weapon 
enhancement. (R., pp.25, 40-41, 111-112.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a 
unified sentence of ten years, with one and one-half years fixed, for aggravated assault 
and the deadly weapon enhancement. (R., pp.48-49.) The district court imposed a 
concurrent sentence of four years, with one and one-half fixed, for stalking in the 
first degree. (R., pp.11 9-120.) Mr. Galvan timely appealed in both cases. (R., pp. 
55, 122-124.) The two appeals were consolidated by order of this Court. 
On appeal, Mr. Galvan argued that the prosecutor, after eliciting testimony 
relating Mr. Galvan's post-Miranda silence during its case in chief, violated his Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process 
when he argued, in closing, that the jury could use Mr. Galvan's post-arrest, post-
Miranda silence as evidence of his guilt.5 (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-13.) Since trial 
counsel did not object to this error, it was raised under this Court's fundamental error 
standard articulated in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). The Court of Appeals held 
there was no Fifth Amendment violation because Mr. Galvan waived his right to remain 
3 Mr. Galvan testified that he affirmatively denied having a gun when he was questioned 
by the police after being Mirandized. (05/15/12 Tr., p.76, Ls.11-15.) 
4 Mr. Galvan did not object to these comments. 
5 Mr. Galvan also argued in his Appellant's Brief that his sentences are excessively 
harsh. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-15.) 
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(Opinion, ) However, the Court of Appeals did find that there was a 
violation of Mr. Galvan's due rights based on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 
610 (1976), where the United States Supreme Court held it is fundamentally unfair to 
provide Miranda warnings and then use a defendant's subsequent silence against 
him/her at trial. (Opinion, p.6.) However, the Court of Appeals then that the error was 
not clear because there is no controlling case law as to the question of whether a 
defendant can invoke Fourteenth Amendment due process protections when the 
defendant is partially silent after being read Miranda warnings. (Opinion, pp.6-10.) 
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1) Should , as the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming 
Mr. Galvan's Judgment of Conviction is inconsistent with this Court's Opinion in 
State v. Easley, 2014 Opinion No. 41 (Mar. 28, 2014)? 
2) Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
ten years, with one and one-half years fixed, for aggravated assault and the 
deadly weapon enhancement, and a concurrent sentence of four years, with one 
and one-half years fixed, for stalking in the first degree? 
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I. 
Review Should 8e Granted As The Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion Affirming 
Mr. Galvan's Judgment Of Conviction Is Inconsistent With Thi~ Court's Opinion In 
State v. Easlev, 2014 Opinion No. 41 (Mar. 28, 2014} 
A. Introduction 
This Court should grant review because the Court of Appeals held that 
Mr. Galvan could not establish fundamental error because there is no controlling case 
law regarding Mr. Galvan's specific claim that the State's use of his partial post-arrest, 
silence during closing argument his Fourteenth Amendment rights 
to due it held in to establish error under the 
fundamental error standard forth in State v. 150 Idaho 209 (2010), the 
defendant must cite to controlling authority that clearly dictates a certain result under the 
facts of the case at hand. It further reasoned that there is no controlling authority as to 
the precise issue of partial silence because there is no Idaho cases directly dealing with 
that issue and there is a federal circuit split as to that issue. Mr. Galvan argues that this 
holding is in consistent with this Court's opinion in State v. Easley, 2014 Opinion No. 41 
(Mar. 28, 2014), because in Easley this Court specifically rejected the notion that "for 
fundamental error to exist, it is necessary for existing authorities to have unequivocally 
resolved the issue in the appellant's favor." Id. at 8. 
B. Standards 
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted only 
"when there are special and important reasons" for doing so, but, ultimately, the 
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decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the 
Supreme Court. I.A. 118(b). This of discretion is not completely unfettered 
though. Rule 118(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of five factors which must be 
considered in evaluating any petition for review: 
1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided an issue of first 
impression; 
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with 
precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States 
Supreme Court; 
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own 
prior decisions; 
4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to for 
the Supreme Courts' of its supervisory authority; and 
5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further 
appellate review is desirable. 
I.A.R. 118(b). Mr. Galvan argues that this Court should grant review because the Court 
of Appeals' Opinion is inconsistent with precedent from this Court. 
C. The Three-Prong Fundamental Error Test Under Perry 
Mr. Galvan did not object to the prosecutor's use of his partial post-arrest, post-
Miranda silence during closing arguments. The standard of review for unobjected to 
error was set forth in Perry, which follows: 
If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it 
shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental 
error doctrine. Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the 
defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the 
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists; and (3) was not harmless. If the 
defendant persuades the appellate court that the complained of error 
satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court shall vacate and 
remand. 
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150 Idaho at 226. 
1. 
Fundamental Error Standard, As An Alleged Violation Of His Federal Right 
To Due Process Is Of Constitutional Magnitude 
The first prong of the Perry analysis is that "the defendant must demonstrate that 
one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated. Perry, 150 
Idaho at 226. The Idaho Supreme Court recently held comments about a defendant's 
post-Miranda silence for the sole purpose of implying guilt violates the defendant's 
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53 (2011). 
According to the Ellington Court: 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U . Constitution, as 
well as Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee a criminal 
defendant the right not to be compelled to testify against himself. U 
Const. amends. V, XIV; Idaho Const. art. I, § 13. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has interpreted this right also to bar the prosecution from commenting on 
a defendant's invocation of that right. In the case of post-arrest silence, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has provided guidance as to when and how that 
silence can and cannot be used by the State at trial. First, because of the 
promise present in a Miranda warning, a prosecutor may not use evidence 
of post-arrest, post- Miranda silence for either impeachment ... or as 
substantive evidence of guilt in the State's case-in-chief .... A prosecutor 
may use evidence of pre- Miranda silence, either pre- or post-arrest, for 
impeachment of the defendant. 
Id. at 60 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). In order to establish that Mr. Galvan's 
federal constitutional rights were violated, he must prove that the post-arrest, post-
Miranda comments on his silence were used solely for the purpose of inferring guilt. 
The United State Supreme Court has also held that a prosecutor's comments on 
a defendant's silence the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. In Doyle v. 
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976), the Supreme Court reasoned that when a defendant 
remains silent after receiving Miranda warnings that silence is ambiguous and "may be 
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nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of Miranda rights." The Doyle Court 
then held that when a defendant receives Miranda warnings from law enforcement the 
defendant also receives an implicit guarantee that his or her will not be used 
against him or her or otherwise carry a penalty. Id. at 618. As such, "it would 
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's 
silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at triaL" Id. 
Turning to the facts of this case, the prosecutor made the following comments 
during its closing argument: 
So one of the things that we look in our everyday dealings 
deciding whether to believe something or not is the motive the person 
that is making the You what kind of an interest that 
person has in the statement. 
There are just so many factors that you use [in] your daily lives to 
determine whether someone is being truthful or not. 
In this particular case, again, you have Alicia Luna that is a 
completely independent witness, only works with Mrs. Galvan. Basically 
was not friends with her, necessarily, just coworkers. And they didn't even 
discuss the event after it happened. 
You look at Ms. Schuldt. She didn't see the gun. But Ms. Schuldt 
heard the arguing and walked away and then later determined there was a 
problem. 
Mr. Galvan ... has a great interest in the outcome of this case. 
Mr. Galvan, although given the opportunity when confronted by Deputy 
Summers to deny that he pulled a gun on Mrs. Galvan, failed to do so. 
It would appear that a reasonable person being accused of 
something like that would, in fact, adamantly state that it never happened 
if, in fact, it did not happen. 
(05/15/12 Tr., p.93, L.6 - p.94, L.6 (emphasis added).) In this case, the prosecutor 
expressly stated that Mr. Galvan's silence can be used to infer guilt because a 
reasonable person who was innocent would adamantly deny guilt when confronted 
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about a such, prosecutor committed misconduct by commenting on 
Mr. Galvan's post-Miranda silence and then expressly drawing 
constitutionally prohibited inference, to wit, that his silence can be used by the jury as 
evidence of his guilt. Therefore, Mr. Galvan has established the first prong of the Perry 
fundamental error standard because he has established an error of constitutional 
magnitude.6 
Mr. Galvan's Claim of Error Meets The Second Prong Of The Perry 
Fundamental Error Standard, As The Alleged Violation Of His Federal 
Right To Due Process Is Clear Or Obvious 
The second prong of the Perry analysis is that "the error must be clear or 
obvious, without for any additional information not contained in the appellate 
record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. The error at issue is clear and obvious because the State 
cannot argue to the jury that a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence can be 
used to infer guilt. 
There could be no tactical reason for defense counsel's failure to object because 
the State was clear that it wanted the jury to infer from Mr. Galvan's silence that he was 
gUilty. On the other hand, there could be a tactical reason to avoid objecting in 
circumstances where the State mentions a defendant's silence in passing and leaves it 
up to the jury to draw the unconstitutional inference. Under those circumstances, 
defense counsel might be unsure whether the jury would draw the unconstitutional 
inference and decide to refrain from objecting to avoid drawing attention to the 
6 As a final note, the Court of Appeals agreed that Mr. Galvan met the first prong of the 
Perry fundamental error standard. (Opinion, pp.5-6.) 
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comment. In the present matter, the State clearly argued in closing that Mr. Galvan's 
should as evidence of his guilt. Since State did not it up 
the jury to draw the unconstitutional inference, an objection by the defense and an 
appropriate ruling by the court would have only reduced the prejudicial impact of the 
State's comment, as opposed to exacerbating its effect. 
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the foregoing argument and concluded that 
Mr. Galvan's alleged error was not clear because he was partially silent after he was 
provided with Miranda warnings. (Opinion, pp.6-9.) The Court of Appeals held that 
there is no Idaho authority addressing this issue and clear error can only be established 
when the error at issue is clear under current case law. (Opinion, pp.6-9.) The Court of 
Appeals then held that there is no controlling federal authority as to this issue because 
the federal circuits are split on the question of whether a defendant can claim a due 
process violation under Doyle when the defendant is partially silent after having 
received Miranda Warnings. (Opinion, pp.9-10.) 
The Court of Appeals' holding, requiring that clear error be established through 
controlling case law, is inconsistent with this Court's Opinion in Easley. In that case, 
Easley argued that a prosecutor's ability to control post-judgment sentencing decisions 
violated Idaho's separation of powers doctrine contained in Article II, Section 1 of the 
Idaho Constitution. Id. at 7-9. In that case, there was no specific trial objection to this 
practice, so that issue was raised under the Perry fundamental error standard. Id. 
While addressing the second prong of the Perry fundamental error standard, this Court 
held as follows: 
This Court has not held that for fundamental error to exist, it is 




in the appellant's favor.2 This Court has examined whether additional 
evidence is required from the record. See, e.g., State v. Dunlap, Nos. 
32773, 37270, 2013 WL 4539806 (2013) (examining the defendant's 
fundamental error claims on issues that have not clearly been decided in 
Idaho; State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 281 P.3d 90 (2012) (examining 
whether the evidence sufficiently demonstrated that restitution was a part 
of the plea agreement). 
2 The Court of Appeals, relying on federal authority adopted 
this rule in State v. Hadden, 152 Idaho 371, 375, 271 P.3d 
1227, 1231 (Ct. App. 2012). The Court of Appeals has 
applied this rule extensively since its adoption. See, e.g., 
State v. Hochrein, 154 Idaho 993, 303 P.3d 1249 (Ct. App. 
2013), review denied; State v. 2013 WL 5493694 
(Ct. App. 2013) (unreported); State v. Parsons, 153 Idaho 
666,289 P.3d 1059 (2012). 
(emphasis added). As , the Court of Appeals' Opinion is inconsistent 
this Court expressly the Court of Appeals' holdings 
which required clear error to established with unequivocal case law, then rejected 
those holdings and held that clear error standard is an evidentiary standard and can be 
established if the evidence in the record evinces an error of constitutional magnitude. 
Id. 
Mr. Galvan recognizes that there is no controlling Idaho authority as to the 
question of whether the use of partial post-Miranda silence as evidence of guilt 
constitutes a due process violation.7 In the event this Court decides to address this 
issue, Mr. Galvan argues that this Court should adopt the approach taken by the Tenth 
Circuit. The Tenth Circuit has held that when a defendant answers some questions and 
refuses to answer others, or in other words is partially silent, this "partial silence does 
not preclude him from claiming a violation of his due process rights under Day/e." 
7 Since this Court has never recognized a distinction between total and partial silence, 
Mr. Galvan argues that this distinction is meaningless and that Idaho prohibits the use 
of all post-Miranda silence. 
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United v. Canterbury, 486 (10th Cir. 1993). Moreover, in Doyle, it 
was held that post-Miranda silence is inherently because it may "be nothing 
more than the exercise of ... Miranda rights." Doyle, 426 U.S., 617. 
Moreover, it makes little sense to afford a defendant is totally silent due process 
protections, but deny those same protections to a defendant who is partially silent. 
In sum, the Court of Appeals' holdings, including its holding in this case, which 
require clear error be established by controlling case law were recently undermined by 
this Court in Easley. As such, this Court should grant review because the Opinion is 
inconsistent with 
Fundamental Error Standard, As The Alleged Violation Of His Federal 
Right To Due Process Affected His Substantial Rights 
The third prong of the Perry analysis is that "the defendant must demonstrate 
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) 
that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 
226. Mr. Galvan can establish that the State's comments on his silence affected the 
outcome of the trial due to the weaknesses in the State's case and the fact that the 
determination of Mr. Galvan'S guilt turned almost entirely on the credibility of 
Mr. Galvan's testimony vis-a-vis the creditability of the State's witnesses. 
One of the weaknesses in the State's case was its inability to produce a gun at 
trial and Mrs. Galvan's testimony that Mr. Galvan had given away his guns before the 
events that occurred in the Melalueca parking lot. (05/15/12 Tr., p.60, L.19 - p.61, L.B, 
p.63, Ls.3-B, p.44, L.7 - p.46, L.5.) The Court of Appeals rejected this as a weakness in 
the State's case because "a person may readily obtain a firearm in the state of Idaho." 
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(Opinion, p.11.) However, the State never produced any evidence trial that 
Mr. Galvan had either purchased a gun or attempted to purchase a gun after he 
given his guns away. 
The foregoing weakness is amplified because the only evidence in the record 
tending to indicate that Mr. Galvan had a gun was the conflicting testimony of 
Mrs. Galvan and Ms. Luna. Ms. Schuldt observed the majority of the conversation 
between Mr. and Mrs. Galvan, but never saw a gun. (05/14/12 Tr., p.154, Ls.10-17, 
p.155, Ls.9-25.) Ms. Luna testified that Mr. Galvan pulled out a gun and then he 
pointed it up and then pointed it down and "it seemed like he was pointing it at the 
person in the car." (05/14/12 Tr., p.11 LsA-10, p.116, 1 ) 
Mrs. Galvan also testified that Mr. Galvan held the gun down and never raised it 
air and never pointed it at her. (05/15/12 Tr., p.9, L.12 - p.10, L.2.) Mrs. Galvan 
testified that she did not understand how Ms. Luna saw the gun, as Mr. Galvan never 
raised it into the air and he kept it down in order to hide it from other people. (05/15/12 
Tr., pA2, Ls.18-25.) It is important to note that both Ms. Luna and Mrs. Galvan testified 
that they observed Mr. Galvan pull out a gun. (05/14/12 Tr., p.115, LsA-10; 05/15/12 
Tr., pA9, Ls.5-18, p.50, L.19 - p.51, L.25.) This is important because they were 
describing the same event, i.e. the moment Mr. Galvan allegedly pulled out the gun, and 
came up with entirely different explanations of that event, which calls into question the 
veracity or accuracy of their testimony. 
In sum, Mr. Galvan can establish the third prong of the Perry fundamental error 
standard. The only evidence the State provided regarding the alleged gun was the 
conflicting testimony of Mrs. Galvan and Ms. Luna. Since Mr. Galvan denied 
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threatening Mrs. Galvan with a gun (05/15t12 Tr., p. Ls.1 8), question 
Mr. Galvan's guilt turned on the credibility of Mr. Galvan versus 
In closing, the State argued that a reasonable person being accused of threatening a 
person with a gun, given the opportunity, would "adamantly state that it never happened 
if, in fact, it did not happen." (05/15/12 Tr., p.93, L.23 - p.94, L.6.) Not only did that use 
of Mr. Galvan's silence undermine Mr. Galvan's credibility, but it also undermined his 
credibility as to the key question before the jury, i.e. whether or not Mr. Galvan was 
being honest when he testified that he did not threaten Mrs. Galvan with a gun. 
Therefore, Mr. Galvan has established that the prosecutor's comments his post-
arrest, post-Miranda silence did affect the outcome of trial proceedings. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence OfTen 
Years, With One And One-Half Years Fixed, For Aggravated Assault And The Deadly 
Weapon Enhancement, And A Concurrent Sentence Of Four Years, With One And 
One-Half Years Fixed, For Stalking In The First Degree 
Mr. Galvan asserts that, given any view of the facts, his sentences are excessive. 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh 
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving 
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Galvan does not allege that 
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his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Mr. Galvan must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
As a preliminary note, the presentence investigator concluded that a period of 
retained jurisdiction would be the most appropriate outcome for Mr. Galvan. 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.11-12.) 
There are various mitigating factors which support the conclusion that 
Mr. Galvan's sentences are excessive. Specifically, Mr. Galvan has a minimal criminal 
record. (PSI, pp.4-5.) Prior to the instant offenses, Mr. Galvan's criminal record 
consisted of an infraction for failure to use a seat belt and a dismissed charge for failing 
to provide proof of insurance. (PSI, pp.4-5.) This is a very minimal criminal record for 
an adult who is forty seven years old. (PSI, p.1.) Mr. Galvan told his mental health 
evaluator that "other than a few traffic violations, he never had issues with the law like 
he presently has until about June 2011, when he believed his wife was engaging in an 
affair with a coworker and he confronted her about it." (19-2524 Examination Report, 
p.1 (attached to PSI).) The fact that Mr. Galvan's only serious criminal behavior was 
associated with the dissolution of his marriage is important because, at sentencing, 
Mr. Galvan's counsel indicated that "he has finally come to the determination he doesn't 
want anything to do with his former spouse .... " (07/24/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.13-15.) 
Counsel also stated that "I think he understands that ... no good will come of trying to 
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her, he doesn't want to." (07/24/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.17-19.) Since Mr. 
has decided that he will not have anything to do with his former spouse, he 
virtually no risk to society because all of his serious criminal behavior was derived from 
the breakdown of that relationship. 
Mr. Galvan is amenable to rehabilitation. According to his mental health 
evaluator, Mr. Galvan would likely complete a domestic violence prevention class if 
ordered "with little resistance." (Idaho Standard Mental Health Assessment, p.6 
(attached to PSI).) 
Mr. Galvan is also a family man and despite the instant offenses, Mr. Galvan was 
allowed to supervised visitation with his children. (PSI, p.11.) 
Mr. Galvan's work employment history is also a mitigating factor. Mr. 
earned his (PSI, p.8.) Mr. Galvan also owned his own roofing business for a 
period of six years. (PSI, p.8; Idaho Standard Mental Health Assessment, p.3 (attached 
to PSI).) 
In sum, Mr. Galvan is a law abiding citizen that suffered a total emotional 
breakdown when his wife of twenty three years started having an affair and wanted to 
end their marriage. This does not excuse his behavior. However, it does put it into 
context. Since Mr. Galvan no longer wants to repair his relationship with his former 
spouse, he has no further reason to engage in the type of behavior which led the 
underlying convictions. This, in turn, means that Mr. Galvan poses a very low threat to 




Mr. Galvan that review be granted. In the event review is granted, 
Mr. Galvan respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, and 
remand this matter to the district court for a new trial. Alternatively, Mr. Galvan 
respectfully requests that this Court reduce the indeterminate portions of his sentences. 
DATED this 9th day of May, 2014. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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